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CONTAGION RISK FOR AUSTRALIAN  
AUTHORIZED DEPOSIT TAKING INSTITUTIONS 
SELIM AKHTER1 
& 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the contagion risk for Australian-owned authorized deposit taking institutions (ADIs) 
spilling from the US and UK banks. We hypothesized that Australian ADIs are prone to extreme shocks 
experienced by its US and UK counterparts. We define four discrete events for the Australian banking sector 
in terms of the number of banks exceeding at a time an extreme value. The extreme value is defined as the 90th 
percentile on the negative tail of the distribution of changes in the distance to default obtained through Black 
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) formula. Then we fit a multinomial logistic model (MLM) to relate 
these events to the number of exceedances (extreme events) occurring in the US and the UK in the previous 
day for the time period September 2006 to September 2011. The MLM estimates reveal strong contagion effects 
for Australian ADIs from the US and UK banks.  
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CONTAGION RISK FOR AUSTRALIAN AUTHORIZED DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines contagion risk for Australian-owned authorized deposit-taking institutions 
(ADIs) and their likelihood of experiencing extreme shocks in the wake of such shocks in their US 
and UK counterparts. Borrowing from extreme value theory (EVT), we define an extreme shock as 
a large value down the negative tail of the distribution of changes in the distance to default (ΔDD). 
Distance to default (DD) is a popular measure of the financial strength of a firm, the difference 
between a firm’s assets and liabilities at a given point in time: the larger the DD the financially 
healthier the firm, and the smaller the probability of default. We consider an extreme shock to have 
occurred if it exceeds the 90th percentile (the 10th smallest value) of its distribution. We define some 
discrete events in the Australian banking sector in terms of the number of ADIs experiencing extreme 
shocks, and label an event a crisis if three or more ADIs simultaneously exceed the extreme value. 
We fit all these events in a multinomial logistic model (MLM) to examine whether extreme shocks 
in Australia can be explained by extreme shocks in the US and UK.  
 
Australia’s banks have been healthier over the last decade than banks in other advanced economies 
like the US and UK. They performed remarkably well during the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC). 
Although they suffered funding pressure immediately afterwards, they recovered from that liquidity 
shortfall quickly. There was no bank failure, and only a small increase in nonperforming loans 
(NPL).  
 
The strength of Australian authorized depository institutions (ADIs)3 in terms of capital adequacy 
has grown steadily since 2007. Their capital adequacy ratio rose to 12.07 percent by the quarter 
ending March 2013, from 10.31 percent in December 2007. The strong trend in capital adequacy has 
been accompanied by a rising share of Tier 1 capital in total capital, reflecting both new capital 
raising and a shift toward lower-risk assets. Profitability also improved after a drop during the GFC, 
with annualized after-tax return on equity rising to 13.04 percent in December 2012 from 4.6 percent 
in September 2009 (APRA 2013).4  
3 Australian authorized deposit taking institutions comprise mostly banks. According to the list provided by 
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), the number of ADIs in operation in September 2013 
was 165 (excluding other ADIs). These were 22 Australian-owned banks, 8 foreign banks, 40 branches of 
foreign banks, 9 building societies and 86 credit unions.  
4 See IMF (2012) for a review of recent developments in the Australian financial sector. 
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 [Insert Figure 1] 
 
This apparent strength does not rule out threats and vulnerabilities in the future. A key worry for 
Australia is that its banking sector is dominated by four large banks, popularly known as the big four. 
By and large their business models are the same, and they are therefore exposed to similar threats. 
More specifically, they have similar degrees of dependence on offshore funding, which exposes them 
to common shocks and disruptions in international financial centres; they are not immune to 
contagion risks from banks operating in other countries.  
 
It is useful to be able to determine the probability of financial distress for Australian banks arising 
from spill-over from international banks, particularly those in the US and UK. How might the 
soundness of Australian deposit-taking institutions be affected when banks in these countries 
encounter turbulence? Studies of contagion risk for Australian ADIs have critical importance in the 
context of the slow recovery of the US economy from recession, the unresolved debt crisis in Europe, 
and more importantly concerns about Australia’s economic strength with the fading of the mining 
boom (IMF 2012). Understanding how foreign financial shocks are transmitted into the domestic 
banking system is relevant to the design and implementation of policies that can make contagion less 
likely. These include prudential polices that reduce dependence on short-term wholesale funding, 
structural banking reforms that aim to limit the cross-border activities of banks, and offering 
responses to shock through liquidity support or other means.  
 
Although a number of studies have investigated contagion across Australia and its developed 
counterparts, most of these (e.g. McNeils 1993, Valadkhani et al. 2008 and Brooks & Henry 2000) 
primarily address spill-over effects across stock markets. There is a dearth of studies addressing the 
contagion risk for Australian-owned banks. Recently Pais and Stork (2011) investigated contagion 
among banks and property sectors within Australia; but this is not the same as cross-border 
contagion. We differ from previous studies in both methodology and coverage. While most 
Australian studies have used vector autoregression (VAR)-based methods to analyze contagion 
across markets, we use the extreme value theory (EVT) framework. An advantage of EVT approach 
over VAR approach is that EVT better captures the phenomenon that large shocks are transmitted 
across financial systems differently from small shocks, providing a new perspective on cross-border 
contagion risk to Australian ADIs.  
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Our results suggest a strong association between extreme shocks in selected systemically important 
US and UK banks and those in Australian ADIs. Statistically significant evidence indicates that the 
probability of a crisis for the Australian banking sector (when three or more ADIs experience 
extreme shocks simultaneously) can be explained by extreme shocks experienced by big banks in 
the USA and UK. The MLM results also suggest that the dynamics of interest rates and volatility in 
global financial markets have a significant influence on the health of Australian ADIs. The global 
economy is uncertain and Australia is not immune to shocks in global markets; the information 
presented here will assist the Australian surveillance authority in monitoring developments in global 
economies in general and in US and UK banks in particular, and to institute appropriate policy 
measures as needed. Our findings concur with observations of a recent IMF report suggesting that 
the uncertainty for the Australian banking sector is likely to stem mainly from the unresolved 
European debt crisis, anemic growth in the US economy and reducing demand for commodities (IMF 
2012).   
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and describes the 
methodology. Section 3 presents and interprets results, while Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
II METHODOLOGY 
 
A majority of the studies dealing with contagion across financial markets have addressed the spill-
over of volatility across financial centres within a vector autoregression (VAR) framework, a system 
of generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH)-type volatility equations that 
express the volatility of one market in terms of the volatility of some other market. Work by Engle 
et al. (1990), Eun and Shim (1989), Hamao et al. (1990), Lin et al. (1994) and Theodossiou and Lee 
(1993) document evidence of volatility spill-overs in different directions. For example, Eun and 
Shim (1989) observe uni-directional spill-over from the US to other markets. Theodossiou and Lee 
(1993) label the US market the ‘exporter’ of volatility. Brooks and Henry (2000), McNeils (1993) 
and Valadkhani et al. (2008) find uni-directional volatility transmission from the US and UK to the 
Australian stock market, while Hamao et al. (1990) and Lin et al. (1994) find bi-directional volatility 
across the US, UK and Japanese stock markets. A second group of studies documents channels of 
contagion across financial institutions. A number of channels have been documented, including, 
among others, depositors’ expectations (Diamond & Dybvig 1983), information asymmetry between 
banks and depositors about the true value of loans (Gorton 1985; Chari & Jaganathan 1988), and 
overlapping claims across banks (Allen & Gale 2000): a similarity in these studies is the idea 
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that contagion of banks within or across countries spreads from the liability side of balance sheet. In 
contrast, Tian et al. (2013) argue that contagion arises from uncertainties of bank assets.  
 
Since the late 1990s, an emerging trend in studies of contagion has been the use of the extreme value 
theory (EVT), which deals with tail events of a distribution5. EVT is useful in analysing the 
behaviour of simultaneous extreme realizations or coexceedances (exceeding a given threshold by a 
number of agents simultaneously) of a variable observed in different geographic locations. The EVT 
approach captures well the phenomenon that large extreme shocks are transmitted across financial 
systems differently from small shocks. Some recent empirical studies using EVT to investigate 
contagion across banks are those of Bae et al. (2003), Chan-Lu et al. (2012), Gropp and Moerman 
(2004) and Gropp et al. (2006). Gropp et al. (2006) use a multinomial logit model to the changes in 
the distance to default of European banks to determine cross-border contagion within the region. 
Using an identical framework, Chan-Lu et al. (2012) investigate the probability of simultaneous 
exceedances among large international banks. Pais and Strok (2011) employ EVT to study the intra-
sector and inter-sector contagion risk of 13 sectors in Australia and observe that of them, property 
sector has the highest degree of dependence on the banking sector. We apply EVT to analyze 
contagion across the Australian and the US and UK banks. Our methodology has similarities with 
Gropp et al. (2006) in that we use the distance to default (DD) to build an indicator variable 
measuring different states of a banking system. It is similar to Chan-Lu et al. (2012) in that we 
assume that contagion risk is associated with extreme negative co-movements in bank soundness.  
 
In our attempt to determine whether extreme negative shocks to Australian ADIs’ stability are 
associated with similar shocks experienced by major banks in the US and the UK, we begin by 
observing whether a bank, either Australian or foreign, has experienced a shock on any day during 
the period from September 2006 to September 2011. We define a shock as any event when an 
exceedance occurs for that bank; it is said to have occurred when a bank exceeds a predefined 
extreme value, the negative 90th percentile of the change in the distance to default (ΔDD). We derive 
shocks from the time series of distance to default (DD) because this is a useful measure of financial 
soundness that has been used in other studies (see, for example, Chan-Lu et al. 2012; Gropp et al. 
2006). Following these studies we define DD for a bank as the standardized difference between the 
market value of the bank’s assets and an estimated default point: a given size of the bank’s liabilities. 
Again, following the existing literature, we consider the sum of deposits, short-term funds and half 
the long-term liabilities as the default point: simply put, DD is the difference between a bank’s assets 
5 See Hull (2012: 314–321) for an introduction.  
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and its default point. We standardize (divide) this difference by the volatility (standard deviation) of 
assets so that the DD of an individual bank can be compared with that of other banks and derive a 
series of daily DD and observe exceedances (extreme shocks) over the sample period. It should be 
pointed out that an exceedance does not mean a default. A default occurs when a bank’s assets fall 
below its default point, whereas an exceedance refers to an event when the change in the distance to 
default (ΔDD) exceeds the negative 90th percentile point.  
 
None of the banks in our sample experienced a default during the sample period, but they did 
experience volatile and sometimes extreme changes in DD, e.g. falling beyond the 90th percentile on 
the left tail of the distribution of ΔDD where we assume contagion risk to be associated with extreme 
negative co-movements in bank soundness. We consider that distress in the banking system of one 
country increases the likelihood of distress in the system of another country over and above what 
would be implied by the normal interdependence that prevails between the systems; accordingly, the 
next step in our analysis is to test the hypothesis that exceedances in Australian banks are a function 
of exceedances in US and UK banks.  
 
To test the hypothesis, we first control for some common shocks then consider a model that takes 
the number of simultaneous exceedances (coexceedances) for Australian banks as the dependent 
variable, and the number of coexceedances among US and UK banks at a prior time as the 
explanatory variables.6 It is expected that correlations between banking systems vary over varying 
states of the economy: the dynamics of DD in a normal condition may be significantly different from 
the dynamics of DD in a turbulent time. Thus, the coefficients measuring the impact of the 
explanatory variables on the response variable are likely to vary depending on prevailing financial 
conditions. To capture this phenomenon, we classify the response (dependent) variable into four 
categories: tranquil (none of the banks’ ΔDD exceeds the extreme value; disturbing (at least one 
bank experiences an extreme shock –that is ΔDD exceeds the extreme value); alarming (two banks 
experience extreme shock simultaneously); and crisis (three or more banks experience extreme shock 
at one time). We fit these events into a multinomial logistic model (MLM), which predicts the 
probability of each of these discrete events for Australia in terms of the exceedances of the UK and 
US banks. This is done after controlling for the influence of some common explanatory variables 
such as developments in the real economy or volatility in domestic and global markets. As past 
shocks are most likely to lead to a current shock for a bank, we consider an autoregressive term (lag 
6 We take a lag of one week (five working days) for an overseas shock to transmit to Australia. 
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of the dependent variable) on the right-hand side of our model. The following paragraphs describe 
DD–the measure of financial strength, from which we generate the response variables for the MLM. 
 
2.1 Distance to Default (DD) 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the idea of distance to default. The vertical axis of the figure measures the value 
of assets and liabilities in a natural logarithm. Suppose at time t = 0 (today) the value (equities + 
liabilities) of a limited liability firm is lnA0 and its liabilities (present value of the principal) are lnL. 
The firm defaults if lnA0 falls below lnL. That works for today (t = 0), but to predict a default at 
some future date, T, we need two pieces of further information: the expected change in the value the 
firm and its dispersion over the period T-t. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
If the expected change in the firm’s value for a day (the average of the possible asset values path in 
Figure 2) is µ and its daily dispersion is 2Aσ , the expected value of the firm for the period T-t can be 
given by 2( ) ( / 2)(T )t Aln A t+ − −µ σ . The standardized difference between the default point (lnL in 
Figure 2) and the expected value of assets is DD, which over the time period T-t at can be expressed 
as:  
 
2
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
  
A
t
t
A
ln L ln A T t
DD
T t
σµ
σ
 
− + − − 
 = −
−
      (1). 
 
We need to derive a series of DD of daily frequency using this formula; but firm values are not 
observed on a daily basis so we simulate asset values using Black and Scholes’s (1974) option pricing 
formula. Under this, when a firm issues one unit of equity (E) and one unit of a zero-coupon bond 
with face value of L and maturing at a future time T, the following relationships can be established 
between the firm’s equity (E) and asset (A) at maturity: as long as the asset value (A) is below the 
value of liability (L), the value of equity (E) is zero because all assets are claimed by the bond holder. 
On the other hand, if the asset value (A) is higher than the principal of the zero-coupon bond (L), 
equity holders receive the residual value and their pay-off increases linearly with the asset value. 
Thus, equity is equivalent to a long position on a call option with the strike price equal to the face 
value of debt. Payoff to the equity-holders can be given by: 
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max(0, )T TE A L= −         (2) 
 
The firm’s equity (the call option) is in the money if the expected value of assets exceeds the expected 
value of liabilities (the strike price). 
 
Black and Scholes (1973) use equation (3) to define equity. We can see that the equation is a 
stochastic version of the balance sheet equation. The first term on the right is the expected value of 
assets and the second is the expected present (discounted) value of liabilities at time t. The liabilities 
are discounted on a continuous basis by the risk-free rate r for the period T-t. N(d) in equation (3) is 
the value of the standard cumulative normal distribution function for d.  
 
( )
1 2( ) ( )
r T t
t tE A N d Le N d
− −= −                     (3) 
2
1 2 1
where
ln( ) [ln( ) ( )( )]
2 ,  and 
A
t
A
A
L A r T t
d d d T t
T t
σ
σ
σ
− + + −
= − = − −
−
   (4) 
 
Our goal at this stage is to generate a series of asset values, and equation (3) takes us close to that 
goal. Now we build a system of equations as (5) and solve the system for At and σA by the iterative 
process proposed by Löffler and Posch (2011), which requires solving a system comprising (T+1) 
equations for (T+1) unknowns. We choose to calculate a series of At spanning 260 days, motivated 
by convenience as well as by the fact that most structural models are used to produce one-year default 
probabilities. Setting (T-t) to 1 for each day within the preceding twelve months simplifies to a 
system like (5) comprising 260 equations.  
 
1
260
2 1
1 1 1 2 1
260 260 260 2 1
[ ( )] / N( )
[ ( )] / N( )....
....
[ ( )] / N( )
t
t
t
r
t t t
r
t t t
r
t t t
A E L e N d d
A E L e N d d
A E L e N d d
−
−
−
−
− − −
−
− − −
= −
= −
= −
     (5) 
 
We solve the system in iterations. The first iteration is to use guesses for the asset values At-a where 
a = 0, 1, …260 and to set the asset volatility (σA) equal to the standard deviation of the natural 
logarithm of returns computed from At-a multiplied by the square root of 260. We take the sum of the 
equity and the default threshold as the initial guess for a firm’s asset. The estimated default threshold 
(L) of an authorized deposit-taking institution is the sum of deposits, short-term funds and half the 
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long-term liabilities. Daily values of these balance sheet items are interpolated from two balance 
sheet dates. The source of these and other pieces of balance sheet information is Bankscope–Bureau 
Van Dijk; the source of equity prices (E) is Datastream. The sample period is 30 September 2005 to 
30 September 2011.  
 
For any further iteration, k = 1…end, asset values and their standard deviations obtained in the 
previous iteration are plugged into equation (4) in order to find d1 and d2. Then we substitute the 
values d1 and d2 in equation (5) to find new At-a, and compute the asset volatility again. We continue 
until the procedure converges. To check convergence, we examine the change in the asset values 
from one iteration to the next. If the sum of squared differences between consecutive asset values 
falls below some small value such as -1010 we stop. Once the series of At is obtained, σA of the series 
is computed for a moving window of 260 days.  
 
The final input of the DD equation—the drift rate µ—is estimated using the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM). We obtain a time-varying beta from the 260 preceding observations of excess 
returns: for the ADI this is the first difference of the ADI’s return on asset minus the risk-free rate; 
for the market it is the market return minus the risk-free return.7 We use 90-day dealer accepted bills 
and S&P ASX-200 as proxies for the risk-free asset and the benchmark market respectively for 
Australia; 3-month treasury bill rate and S&P 500 for the US; and 3-month treasury bill rate and 
FTSE-Local for the UK. The source of data for these variables is Datastream. The sample period 
again is 30 September 2005 to 30 September 2011, but because beta is obtained from a moving 
window of the preceding 260 observations, the date when we get beta for the first time is 29 
September 2006. Accordingly, the DD calculation starts from this date (29 September 2006).  
After obtaining the series of DD, we compute ΔDD over five days for each ADI in our sample using 
Equation (6).  
 
 , ,,
,| |
i t i t
i t
i t
DD DD
DD
DD
−
−
−
∆ = 5
5
       (6) 
 
The choice of a five-day period is motivated by previous studies. Chan-Lau et al. (2012) argue that 
extreme events are more significant if they are prolonged: events that last for only a day are of little 
7Thus, 1 1( ) (1 )t t f texcess return on an ADI’s e A Aass t r− −= − + and 
1 1( ) (1 )t t f texcess return on the mar M M rket − −= − + where A is asset value, M is the market capitalization and 
rf is the risk-free rate. 
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concern; and the use of weekly changes reduces ‘noise’ in the data. Thus, we end up with 1301 
observations of ∆DD for each ADI for the period 5 October 2006 to 30 September 2011. 
 
The next step is to find the exceedances within the distribution of iDD∆ and create the outcome 
variable for the multinomial logistic model. As previously mentioned, we define the 90th percentile 
point on the negative tail as the threshold, and an exceedance (or extreme event) to have occurred at 
time t for the ith sample if ,i tDD∆  exceeds the threshold. Then we count the number of simultaneous 
exceedances (or coexceedances) across the sample for each t and define an index yt based on the 
four discrete events, tranquil, disturbing, alarming and crisis. This takes us to the final stage of the 
analysis: identifying the underlying forces of these events. To do that, we fit these discrete events 
into a MLM, chosen because our dependent variable (the four states of financial condition just 
described) is a count variable. The most popular models that fit count variables are binary choice 
logit or probit models, but these are not applicable here because our dependent variable takes more 
than just the numbers 0 and 1; multinomial logistic and ordered logistic models are more suitable for 
our context. Of these two, the MLM serves better because it does not restrict the marginal effects of 
switching from one response to another. Had we used ordered logit, the marginal effect of changing 
from tranquil to disturbance would have appeared the same as that of moving from alarming to a 
crisis event.  
 
2.2. Multinomial Logistic Model (MLM) 
 
Many studies have used logistic regression to determine the probability of extreme shocks. Bae et 
al. (2003) use binomial logistic regression to predict the probability of coincidence of extreme return 
shocks across countries within and across regions. Groop et al. (2006) and Christiansen and Ranaldo 
(2009) employ an MLM framework to measure the probability of large changes in DD. The response 
variable in a binomial regression takes two outcomes, whereas in the MLM it takes more than two 
discrete choices. The MLM predicts the probability of different choices from a designated set of 
explanatory variables. In order for the model to be identified, the multinomial logistic considers one 
of the various choices as the base outcome and the probability of different outcomes is computed as 
the ratio of the probabilities of a given outcome to the base outcome. As we assume outcome 4 
(tranquil) as the base outcome, the, probability that the response variable (y) at time t is equal to the 
ith outcome is given by (7):  
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where xt is the row vector of the observed values of the explanatory variables for yt. βm is the 
coefficient vector for the base outcome and β i is that of the ith outcome (i = 1,2 and 3). The MLM 
estimates β by the maximum likelihood method.8  
 
2.3. Explanatory Variables 
 
The key explanatory variable in our model is the contagion risk for Australian ADIs. Following Bae 
et al. (2003), we define this as the risk of Australian ADIs experiencing extreme shocks as a result 
of such shocks experienced earlier by banks in the US and UK. We use the number of exceedances 
among US and UK banks as the measure of the contagion risk for Australian ADIs. We justify this 
by the fact that contagion may be channelled through either direct or indirect linkages with banks 
operating in different geographic locations. For example, external linkages could stem from direct 
and indirect equity exposures of local banks to overseas banks or, conversely, from shareholdings of 
local banks by foreign banks, direct exposures through loan books, deposit and funding sources from 
overseas or from foreign banks operating in a particular country, payments and settlement systems, 
and holdings of credit risk transfer instruments written on assets held by local or overseas institutions. 
Contagion may also occur without any explicit link when a negative shock in one bank is 
misinterpreted by investors as a signal of diminished soundness in other banks, either in the same 
country or in a different country (Chan-Lu et al. 2012).  
 
Shocks from the US or UK may not transmit to Australia in real time. We need to allow a reasonable 
space of time for a shock encountered by US or UK banks to be felt by Australians. The explanatory 
variable measuring contagion in our model is the number of exceedances for US and UK banks the 
day before an exceedance experienced by an Australian ADI.9  
8 For further description see Greene 2012, pp. 763–766. 
9 Recall that an exceedance occurs when a ΔDD falls below the smallest 10th value of the distribution of ΔDD 
and that ΔDD represents change in distance to default (DD) over 5 working days. DDs are computed for each 
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 An auto-regressive pattern is a common phenomenon in financial time series. Fama and French 
(1996) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) note that short-term returns tend to continue; stocks with 
high returns in the previous twelve months tend to have high returns in the future. Christiansen and 
Ranaldo (2009), similarly, find that the number of extreme negative returns today is positively related 
to the number of extreme negative return yesterday. We find a similar pattern in the extreme events 
(exceedances) of Australian ADIs, as the transition matrix (Table 1) reveals. For instance, during the 
period October 2006 to October 2011, we observe a total of 179 crisis events; six are followed by a 
tranquil, 21 by a disturbing, 31 by an alarming, and 121 by a crisis event. We therefore add to our 
model an auto-regressive term of order 1: that is, a one-day lag in the number of exceedances for 
Australian ADIs.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
We add some domestic and global factors to the model to verify the strength of the relationship 
between different extreme events for Australian ADIs and contagion from US and UK banks. For 
example, we control the relationship for developments in real economy using change in the 10-year 
Australian government bond yield. A positive relationship exists between a change in government 
bond yield and the change in the health of the economy: when the economy is in a bad state, the 
interest rate is decreased; and when it is in a good state, the interest rate is increased. Naturally, banks 
are likely to experience fewer extreme shocks in a good state than in a bad state of the economy. 
Thus an inverse relationship holds between a change in government bond yield and the probability 
of extreme shock.  
 
We also control our model for influences from some other local sources. These include the 
conditional volatilities of the S&P ASX-200 financial price index, the Australian commodity price 
day over the sample period from the simulated values of assets and liabilities. While simulating the value of 
assets and liabilities on a given day for banks in different countries, we take into consideration the time 
differences. When the Sydney market opens at 9 a.m. on, say, Friday, it is Friday at 1 a.m. in London, so 
Sydney opens 8 hours after London has closed for Thursday. Likewise, when Sydney market opens at 9.00 
a.m. for, say, Friday, it is 7 p.m. on Thursday in New York, so Sydney opens for Friday two hours after New 
York closes for Thursday. We consider ΔDD for Australia at time t is contemporaneous with ΔDD for US and 
UK banks at time t-1, so a one-day lag in the number of exceedances for the US and UK banks is actually a 
lag of two calendar days. 
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index, the exchange rate against the US dollar, and the Australian property price index.10 The source 
of the first three variables is Datastream, and of the Australian property prices is the Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS) database.11 Another explanatory variable in our model is the 
conditional volatility of the global financial services price index, capturing shocks from the global 
financial markets. For the conditional volatilities (ht) of the indices, we consider GARCH (1,1) given 
by equation (8).  
 
2 2 2
1 1t t th w hαε β− −= + +         (8) 
 
This model forecasts the variance 2th  of date t return (xt) of an index as a weighted average of a 
persistence term (the constant w), yesterday’s variance 2 1th − , and yesterday’s squared error
2
1tε −  of the 
constant only mean model: ;t tx c ε= +  where xt is the annualized log return of the index and c is the 
constant.  
 
2.4. The Sample   
 
Because the distance to default is calculated from market value of equity, we consider only the ASX-
listed ADIs. Furthermore, our aim is to investigate contagion risk only for Australian-owned ADIs. 
This limits our sample to ten ADIs: National Australia Bank (NAB), Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (CBA), Australia New Zealand Bank (ANZ), Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC), 
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank (BEN), Bank of Queensland (BOQ), Macquarie Bank (MQG), Suncorp-
Metway (SUN), Rock Building Society (ROC), and Wide Bay Australia (WBA). Since our aim is to 
examine contagion risk for authorized deposit-taking institutions—not necessarily for banks—we 
have banks and building societies in our sample. For sources of contagion, we consider five US 
banks— Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs; and 
five UK banks— HSBC, Lloyds, Barclays, Standard Chartered and the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
These are among the most influential banks on the planet. According to the financial stability board 
(FSB)12 they are all systemically important in that the failure of any one of them could trigger a 
10 All these are measured in Australian dollars. 
11 We use the index of property price per existing dwelling covering eight major cities. This data set is available 
quarterly. Daily data is simulated by interpolation; see BIS (2013).  
12 The FSB is an advisory board hosted by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS). It coordinates at 
international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies, and 
develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector 
policies.  
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global crisis. They are homogeneous, and each set reasonably represents the banking sector of the 
country.  
 
III RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents the results of three specifications of MLM. Our dependent variable is a count 
variable measuring the number of exceedances. Based on these numbers, we define four levels of 
event. For example, a crisis occurs if on a given day three or more banks exceed the negative 90th 
percentile of the distribution of changes in the distance to default, whereas a tranquil state obtains 
when there is no exceedance at all. The multinomial logistic regression estimates the coefficients of 
the explanatory variables corresponding to each of the states or outcomes, and predicts their 
probability using these coefficients. For the sake of identification, one outcome is treated as the base, 
which in this case is tranquil (no exceedance). Coefficients of the explanatory variables for the base 
model are set to zero; the coefficients of the explanatory variables for the other models represent 
change relative to the base model. 
  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The explanatory variables lag number of exceedances: US and lag number of exceedances: UK 
measure the contagion effects for Australian ADIs. We observe that these variables are statistically 
significant across the various specifications, suggesting strong contagion spilling into Australian 
ADIs from US and UK banks. The statistical significance is even stronger for crisis compared with 
disturbing events, suggesting that the probability of a large number of exceedances in Australia is 
associated with contagion risk from the United States. As expected, the auto-regressive term –one 
day lag number of exceedances: Au turns up with a positive coefficient and strong statistical 
significance. Change in 10-year Australian government bond yield appears with a negative 
coefficient, suggesting an inverse relationship between the health of the real economy and the 
probability of extreme events for Australian ADIs. We have also found the Australian ADIs to be 
exposed to volatility in the global financial market. The positive coefficient of the explanatory 
variable, the global financial services price index, suggests an increase in the number of extreme 
events experienced by the Australian ADIs is associated with an increase in volatility of the global 
financial markets. We consider some other variables (Model 3, Table 2) presuming that they may 
explain the probability of extreme shocks for Australian banks. These variables include the GARCH 
(1,1) volatility of Australian commodity prices, property price index (urban dwellings in eight major 
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cities) and the exchange rate of Australian dollar against the US dollar. Even after controlling for 
these variables, the contagion effects remain almost unchanged.  
 
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 presents the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the predicted probabilities of 
crisis, alarming and disturbing states. The marginal effect is the derivative (slope) of the prediction 
function, which in the context of MLM is the change in the probability of a given outcome for each 
unit change in the explanatory variable. The slope of a function can be greater than one, even if the 
values of the function are all between 0 and 1. The probability of a crisis event for Australian ADIs 
on any day increases on average by approximately 2% and 3% when the number of exceedances 
increased by 1 on the previous day in the US and UK respectively. The probability of an alarming 
state for Australia on a given day increases on average by approximately 3% and 4% if the number 
of exceedances increased by 1 in the US and UK respectively on the previous day. Hence, the MLM 
results reveal strong contagion risk for Australian ADIs stemming from US and UK banks. These 
results are robust across various specifications. Table 4 summarizes the estimated probabilities of 
the different states of financial distress for the Australian ADIs; Figure 3 depicts the dynamics of the 
response variable. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
In order to verify the strength of the contagion effects, we consider only the lag distance to default 
of individual ADIs in Model 5 and Model 6 (Table 5). Our dependent variable is derived from the 
distance to default, but DDs themselves can explain only 16% to 18% of the variation in the 
dependent variable as indicated by the McFadden's adjusted pseudo R2, whereas the pseudo R2 
increases to 40% as the contagion effects are added (Model 4). Overall, the pseudo R2 ranges from 
37% to 40% over different specifications, suggesting that the data considered in the study fits the 
model well. The chi-squared and corresponding p-values indicate the joint significance of the 
explanatory variables. The results are robust over different time periods.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
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 Our sample spans 2006 to 2011, a period involving both tranquil and turbulent times for global 
markets. It is likely that the estimated probabilities are skewed to particular subsets of the sample. 
For example, the probability of crisis events is higher in 2008 (during the GFC) than in relatively 
calm years, as Figure 4 reveals. Given this, we use dummy variables to capture the effects of different 
years; their incorporation makes no change in the estimated coefficients or signs. In addition, we 
consider different time periods: for example, the sample period for models 1 and 2 is January 1, 2007 
to September 30, 2011, and for model 3 is September 29, 2005 to September 30, 2011 (Table 2). 
Again, there is no observable difference in the output as far as sign, size and statistical significance 
of contagion effects are concerned. 
 
Finally we check the robustness of our estimates against possible endogeneity and multicollinearity. 
The explanatory variable measuring extreme shocks for the US and UK banks in our model is likely 
to have endogeneity as a result of unobservable individual heterogeneity driving both the dependent 
variable (extreme events defined in terms of exceedances for Australian banks) and the explanatory 
variable itself. Two instrumental variable (IV) approaches have been widely used in empirical 
research to address endogeneity: two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS); and two-stage residual 
inclusion (2SRI).13 Both methods entail estimating an equation in which the endogenous regressor 
is the dependent variable. In 2SPS, the predicted values from the first stage regression replace the 
endogenous regressor in the second stage. In 2SRI, the first-stage residuals, rather than the first-stage 
fitted values, are included in the second stage along with the observed values of the endogenous 
regressor.  
 
Adopting a two-stage approach in our study means that we first estimate an extreme shock 
(exceedance) equation for both the US and UK: 
 
 i i iz bW ε= +          (9) 
 
where zi is the extreme shock indicator for country i (US or UK), Wi is a matrix of explanatory 
variables that affect these indicators,  b is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and iε
is the vector of error term. Using 2SPS, we estimate our outcome equation: 
 
ˆ ˆi us us uk uk i iy α z α z βX u= + + +         (10) 
13 See for example Terza et al (2008) and citations therein. For description see Cameron and Trivedi (2009).  
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 where yi is the outcome vector (tranquil, disturbing, alarming or crisis), ˆusz and ˆukz  are the 
instruments for extreme shocks for the US and UK respectively—that is, the fitted values of zi 
obtained from estimating Equation (9), Xi is the matrix of exogenous explanatory variables, β is the 
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and u i is the error term. For 2SRI, we replace zs with 
residuals obtained from (9), and estimate the outcome equation:  
 
ˆ ˆi us ius uk iuk i i iy α ε α ε β X u= + + +         (11) 
 
Recall that Xi in (11) includes both exogenous and endogenous regressors. We specify both (10) and 
(11) as  multinomial equations and estimate them using the method of maximum likelihood. There 
is no specific direction as to the choice of specification for the first stage estimation. Angriest and 
Krueger (2001) use OLS for the first stage, arguing that consistency of the estimates from the second 
stage IV regression does not require that the first-stage functional form be correctly specified. Terza 
(2008) recommends a nonlinear specification in the first stage if the second-stage specification is 
nonlinear as well. We use both OLS and multinomial logit to obtain the first stage estimates (Table 
6). Both methods reveal a statistically significant positive link between extreme shocks in US and 
UK banks and extreme events in Australian banks.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Now we consider multicollinearity. Two types of collinearity may exist among the regressors: perfect 
collinearity and near-collinearity. Perfect collinearity appears when one variable is perfectly 
correlated with other explanatory variables. None of the explanatory variables in our models is found 
to achieve this.14 To check near collinearity among the regressors we estimate the variable inflation 
factor for the explanatory variables in Model 3 (see Table 2).15 The rule of thumb is that there is 
evidence of near-collinearity if the largest VIF is greater than 10. We find two variables in Model 3, 
volatility of Australian commodity price index and volatility of Australian property price index, to 
have a VIF greater than 10; but as we can see in Table 2, inclusion of these variables makes no 
significant difference to the estimated coefficients of the variables measuring contagion risk for 
Australian banks.  
14 We estimate our models using STATA which drops such variable by default. 
15 See Baum (2006) for description. 
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 IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper studies the contagion risk for Australian-owned ADIs transmitted from the US and UK 
banks. We model extreme shocks for Australian ADIs as a function of extreme shocks experienced 
by the US and UK banks. Four discrete states of financial conditions were defined in terms of the 
number of banks exceeding at a time the predetermined extreme value. For example we defined crisis 
for Australian ADIs as a discrete event when three or more of them exceed the predetermined 
extreme value. Then we attempt to find the probability of that event in terms of contagion effect from 
the US and UK banks and a set of explanatory variables including the 10-year Australian government 
bond yield, conditional volatility of Australian financial sector price index, Australian commodity 
price index, exchange rate and Australian property index.    
 
Our research finds evidence of strong association between these indicators and the explanatory 
variables; it suggests a statistically significant positive relationship between the probability of a crisis 
event and contagion effects from the US and UK banks. The MLM results also indicate that long-
term Australian government bond yield and volatility in financial markets significantly explain the 
probability of the different states of financial health for Australian ADIs. As the global economy is 
uncertain and Australia is not immune to shocks in global markets, the Australian surveillance 
authority should closely monitor developments in global economies in general and those in US and 
UK banks in particular, and directs policy measures accordingly. For example an extra capital buffer 
for contagion risk should be put in place for the major Australian banks especially when the big US 
and UK banks experience financial turbulences.   
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Figure 1: Performance Australian ADIs during September 2004 – March 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Impaired assets are those in arrear for 90 days.  Source: APRA (2013) 
 
 
Figure 2: Distance to Default 
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Figure 3: Probability of Different State of Financial Distress for Australian ADIs: 
Multinomial Logistic Estimates  
 
 
Figure 4: Probability of Crisis Event  
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Table 1 
Transition Matrix of the Extreme Events for the Australian ADIs 
 Tranquil Disturbing Alarming Crisis Total 
Tranquil 633 85 10 9 737 
  (0.86) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (1.00) 
Disturbing 78 108 47 19 252 
  (0.31) (0.43) (0.19) (0.08) (1.00) 
Alarming 20 38 44 30 132 
  (0.15) (0.29) (0.33) (0.23) (1.00) 
Crisis 6 21 31 121 179 
  (0.03) (0.12) (0.17) (0.68) (1.00) 
Figures represent the number of a row event followed by a column event. Thus, 633 is the number of times a tranquil event is 
followed by a tranquil event, 85 is the number of times when a tranquil event is followed by a disturbing event. Figures in 
parenthesis are the probabilities. 
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Table 2 
Multinomial Logistic Estimates: Coefficients 
Crisis Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lag number of exceedances: AU+ 2.5383*** 2.5383*** 2.4348*** 
Lag number of exceedances: UK++ 0.7612*** 0.7612*** 0.7698*** 
Lag number of exceedances: US++ 0.5668*** 0.5668*** 0.5814*** 
Change in 10-year Aus government bond yield -7.0492** -7.0492**  
Volatility of Australian financial price index -22.5696 -22.5696 -29.7529 
Volatility of World financial price index 62.3534* 62.3534* 51.4260† 
Volatility of Australian commodity price index   312.360 
Volatility of exchange rate (AU$/US$)   1.2816 
Volatility of Australian property price index   -141.915† 
Dummy: 2008 0.2701  0.4134 
Dummy: 2009 -0.1437 -0.4139 -0.2919 
Dummy: 2010 -0.9618 -1.2320* -0.9355 
Dummy: 2011  -0.2701  
Dummy: 2007 -0.9079 -1.1780* -0.7924 
Dummy :2006  -34.6115  
Constant -5.5721*** -5.3020*** -7.1685*** 
Alarming    
Lag number of exceedances: AU 2.0571*** 2.0571*** 1.9670*** 
Lag number of exceedances: UK 0.5066** 0.5066** 0.4822** 
Lag number of exceedances: US 0.4726** 0.4726** 0.5394*** 
10-year Aus government bond yield -6.6043*** -6.6043***  
Volatility of Australian financial price index -53.6977 -53.6977 -59.6569† 
Volatility of Australian financial price index 49.4490* 49.4490* 46.2213† 
Volatility of Australian commodity price index   381.7514 
Volatility of exchange rate (AU$/US$)   -2.686 
Volatility of Australian property price index   -205.1899 
Dummy: 2008 0.3217  0.2588 
Dummy: 2009 0.5129 0.1912 0.3438 
Dummy: 2010 -0.7022 -1.0239* -0.9149† 
Dummy: 2011  -0.3217  
Dummy: 2007 -0.9753† -1.2970** -1.1175* 
Dummy: 2006  -36.4316  
Constant -3.4908*** -3.1691*** -5.0053*** 
Disturbing    
Lag number of exceedances: AU 1.4523*** 1.4523*** 1.3893*** 
Lag number of exceedances: UK 0.2607† 0.2607† 0.2518 
Lag number of exceedances: US 0.4428*** 0.4428*** 0.4875*** 
10-year Aus government bond yield -3.1699* -3.1699*  
Volatility of Australian financial price index -33.5374 -33.5374 -32.8516 
Volatility of Australian financial price index 40.3820† 40.3820† 35.605 
Volatility of Australian commodity price index   -171.1593 
Volatility of exchange rate (AU$/US$)   -0.6674 
Volatility of Australian property price index   215.1216 
Dummy: 2008 0.04  0.0954 
Dummy: 2009 -0.262 -0.302 -0.3339 
Dummy: 2010 -0.6773* -0.7173* -0.6916* 
Dummy: 2011  -0.04  
Dummy: 2007 -1.2880*** -1.3280*** -1.3021*** 
Dummy: 2006  -37.5367  
Constant -1.6435*** -1.6035** -1.9485* 
McFadden's adjusted pseudo R2 0.369 0.384 0.367 
Log Likelihood -734.7544 -734.7544 -736.9916 
Chi2 858.5695 914.7527 854.095 
P (Chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: 
+Lag of one day. 
++Lag of one day (or two calendar days after adjusting for the time difference among Australia, US and UK) 
 † p<0.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p< 0.001 
Dependent variables are the different outcomes defined as follows. Tranquil: Number of exceedances = 0;; Disturbing: Number 
of exceedances = 1; Alarming: Number of exceedances = 2; Crisis: Number of exceedances ≥ 3. Base outcome is tranquil (no-
exceedance). An exceedance occurs when a ∆DD falls in the negative 10% tail. Sample period is January 1, 2007 to September 
30, 2011 for models 1 and 2 and September 29, 2005 to September 30, 2011 for model 3. 
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Table 3 
Multinomial Logistic Estimates: Marginal Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Crisis Alarming Disturbance Crisis Alarming Disturbance 
Lag number of exceedances: AU 0.0990*** 0.168*** 0.160*** 0.0911*** 0.168*** 0.191*** 
 (6.87) (9.02) (6.54) (6.36) (8.9) (7.46) 
Lag number of exceedances: UK 0.0357*** 0.0342† 0.0202 0.0329*** 0.0361* 0.0288 
 (4.19) (1.91) (0.73) (4.14) (2.12) (1.02) 
Lag number of exceedances: US 0.0195** 0.0409** 0.0565* 0.0171** 0.0382** 0.0637** 
 (2.74) (2.85) (2.52) (2.6) (2.75) (2.76) 
10-year Aus government bond yield -0.290* -0.608** -0.178 -0.269* -0.600** -0.272 
 (2.48) (2.64) (0.57) (2.56) (2.76) (0.86) 
Volatility of Australian financial price index 0.905 -3.695 -0.173 0.679 -3.618 -0.0735 
 (0.56) (1.02) (0.04) (0.47) (1.06) (0.02) 
Volatility of World financial price index 2.168† 4.098† 3.644 1.954† 3.932† 4.492 
 (1.95) (1.66) (0.95) (1.95) (1.66) (1.14) 
Number of observations 992 992 992 1040 1040 1040 
  
Notes: 
+Lag of one day. 
++Lag of one day (or two calendar days after adjusting for the time difference among Australia, US and UK) 
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Figures in parenthesis are t statistics.  
Dependent variables are the different outcomes defined as follows. Tranquil: Number of exceedance = 0; Disturbing: Number of exceedances = 1; Alarming: 
Number of exceedances = 2; Crisis: Number of exceedances ≥ 3. Base outcome is tranquil (no-exceedance). An exceedance occurs when a ∆DD falls in the 
negative 10% tail. Model 1 and Model 2 differs in the length of the sample period which is January 1, 2007 to September 30, 2011 for models 1 and September 
29, 2005 to September 30, 2011 for model 2. The marginal effect of an independent variable is the derivative (slope) of the prediction function, which, in the 
context of MLM is the probability of a given outcome. The slope of a function can be greater than one, even if the values of the function are all between 0 
and 1.   
      
 
Table 4 
 Estimated Probability 
  
States Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tranquil 992 0.546371 0.357018 0.000000 0.954297 
Disturbance 992 0.200605 0.139455 0.000035 0.574599 
Alarming 992 0.109879 0.117504 0.004571 0.516706 
Crisis 992 0.143145 0.252746 0.000706 0.992943 
Notes: Summary of the Probability of the outcome variable produced by multinomial logistic regression of 
Model 1. 
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Table 5 
Multinomial Logistic Estimates: Coefficients 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Crisis    
Lag number of exceedances: AU+ 2.5246***   
Lag number of exceedances: UK++ 0.4853   
Lag number of exceedances: US++ 0.6415*   
Change in 10-year Aus government bond yield -11.6302***   
Volatility of Australian financial price index -91.9947   
Volatility of World financial price index 125.1649*   
Volatility of Australian commodity price index    
Volatility of exchange rate (AU$/US$)    
Volatility of Australian property price index    
Lag DD: WBC -0.0210 -2.7688 -2.7721 
Lag DD: NAB 1.6223 2.2082** 2.1270** 
Lag DD: CBA 7.6554* 8.0183*** 8.2489*** 
Lag DD: ANZ -8.9590* -8.6384*** -8.7656*** 
Lag DD: BOQ 3.0637 1.6123 1.6538 
Lag DD: SUN 2.8280 -1.2215 -1.3019 
Lag DD: BEN -2.2598 -2.5817† -2.6965* 
Lag DD: MQG -4.9272* -6.0288*** -6.0105*** 
Lag DD: ROC -0.3142 1.0408 0.9064 
Lag DD: WBA 0.0654 5.8680** 6.0831** 
Constant -9.4525* -5.7332*** -5.7163*** 
Alarming    
Lag number of exceedances: AU 2.0877***   
Lag number of exceedances: UK 0.4221   
Lag number of exceedances: US 0.4943*   
10-year Aus government bond yield -10.2443**   
Volatility of Australian financial price index -130.8641   
Volatility of Australian financial price index 57.8146   
Volatility of Australian commodity price index    
Volatility of exchange rate (AU$/US$)    
Volatility of Australian property price index    
Lag DD: WBC 0.5398 1.2621 1.2909 
Lag DD: NAB 2.7836 1.8078* 1.7252* 
Lag DD: CBA 1.175 7.1765*** 7.4165*** 
Lag DD: ANZ -4.6111 -7.9791*** -8.1171*** 
Lag DD: BOQ 6.1875† 2.3312 2.3645 
Lag DD: SUN -1.652 -2.6849* -2.7798* 
Lag DD: BEN -3.374 -2.7526† -2.8616† 
Lag DD: MQG -2.1633 -2.7423** -2.7068** 
Lag DD: ROC -4.1449 -2.8637† -3.0113* 
Lag DD: WBA 2.6245 2.8614 3.0561† 
Constant -8.0587* -4.4009*** -4.3784*** 
Disturbing    
Lag number of exceedances: AU 1.5043***   
Lag number of exceedances: UK 0.1778   
Lag number of exceedances: US 0.3686†   
10-year Aus government bond yield -4.7283†   
Volatility of Australian financial price index -6.383   
Volatility of Australian financial price index 37.89   
Volatility of Australian commodity price index    
Volatility of exchange rate (AU$/US$)    
Volatility of Australian property price index    
Lag DD: WBC 0.0651 -1.5877 -1.5712 
Lag DD: NAB -0.6468 0.7358 0.6289 
Lag DD: CBA 1.3995 3.0191† 3.3074* 
Lag DD: ANZ -2.1572 -4.7177*** -4.8631*** 
Lag DD: BOQ 1.8393 2.2062 2.2346 
Lag DD: SUN -0.2509 -0.3109 -0.4446 
Lag DD: BEN -1.142 -1.5077 -1.6429 
Lag DD: MQG -0.9039 -1.3236† -1.2678† 
Lag DD: ROC -2.1205 -1.7651 -1.9624† 
Lag DD: WBA 3.165 3.2665* 3.5412** 
Constant -1.6496 -2.1878** -2.1651** 
McFadden's adjusted pseudo R2 0.401 0.168 0.187 
Log Likelihood -350.9098 -727.7043 -728.7715 
Notes: 
+Lag of one day. 
++Lag of one day (or two calendar days after adjusting for the time difference among Australia, US and UK) 
† p<0.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p< 0.001 
Dependent variables are different outcomes defined as follows. Tranquil = 0 exceedance; Disturbing: Number of 
exceedances = 1; Alarming: Number of exceedances = 2; Crisis: Number of exceedances ≥ 3. Base outcome is tranquil 
(no-exceedance). An exceedance occurs when a ∆DD falls in the negative 10% tail. Sample period is January 1, 2007 to 
September 30, 2011 for models 4 and 5 and September 29, 2005 to September 30, 2011 for model 6. 
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Table 6 
Estimates from 2SPS and 2SRI 
 2SPS 2SRI 
Crisis   
Lag number of exceedances: AU 2.4348*** 2.4942*** 
Predicted Values (xb_uk) 1.1329***  
Predicted Values (xb_us) 0.8035***  
Lag number of exceedances: UK  0.8839*** 
Lag number of exceedances: US  0.4683** 
Residual: UK  0.9288*** 
Residual: US  0.1648 
Alarming   
Lag number of exceedances: AU 1.9670*** 2.0158*** 
Predicted Values (xb_uk) 0.7096**  
Predicted Values (xb_us) 0.7455***  
Lag number of exceedances: UK  0.5569** 
Lag number of exceedances: US  0.4567** 
Residual: UK  0.7438*** 
Residual: US  0.1749 
Disturbing   
Lag number of exceedances: AU 1.3893*** 1.4419*** 
Predicted Values (xb_uk) 0.3706  
Predicted Values (xb_us) 0.6738***  
Lag number of exceedances: UK  0.2726† 
Lag number of exceedances: US  0.4460** 
Residual: UK  0.5259** 
Residual: US  0.2745 
McFadden's adjusted pseudo R2 0.367 0.377 
Log Likelihood -736.9916 -724.6674 
Notes: 
This is an excerpt of the actual estimates presenting only the variable of interest namely the indicator of extreme 
shock (exceedances). The table with full coverage could be provided if required.  
+Lag of one day. 
++Lag of one day (or two calendar days after adjusting for the time difference among Australia, US and UK). 
† p<0.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p< 0.001 
Dependent variables are different outcomes defined as follows. Tranquil = 0 exceedance; Disturbing: Number of exceedances = 1; 
Alarming: Number of exceedances = 2; Crisis: Number of exceedances ≥ 3. Base outcome is tranquil (no-exceedance). An 
exceedance occurs when a ∆DD falls in the negative 10% tail. Sample period is January 1, 2007 to September 30, 2011. Fitted values 
(xb_uk and xb_us) and residuals for the outcomes are obtained via multinomial logit. 
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